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Introduction: Secular Society and the Concept of Civil 
Religion 
Japan is a secular society in that there is a formal constitutional sepa- 
ration between state and religion which ensures that the state re- 
frains from religious activities, and that religious organizations can- 
not receive any privileges from the state, nor exercise any political 
authority.' The 1946 Constitution, which of course was promulgated 
by an American-dominated Occupation government and based upon 
American concepts of the separation of church and state, formally 
broke one of the most enduring themes in Japanese history, that of 
the close relationship between religion, politics and state, in which 
the state patronized and supported specific religious traditions, 
which in turn provided support and legitimization for the state, and 
which also served as a force for national unity and the development 
of a sense of national (and, indeed, nationalistic) consciousness. 
While the example of State Shinto, which had been a major ideologi- 
cal prop of the militant and Imperialist nationalism of the 1868-1945 
period, was foremost in the minds of those who framed the 1946 
Constitution, Shinto was not the only religion that has been in such a 
position in Japan. Indeed, Buddhism had itself been closely associ- 
ated for long periods of Japanese history with the state, operating 
almost as a pillar of the political system from its earliest entry into 
Japanese society, through to its role as a virtual system of local gov- 
ernment and control during the Tokugawa period. Through much of 
Japanese history, then, a civil religion (to use Rousseau's term 
brought into prominence by Robert   ell ah)^ existed framed around a 
specific religious tradition, most recently State Shinto, and closely as- 
sociated with the pt~blic and political realms. 
In the current situation, however, through the rupture of the 
bonds that tied religion and state, there is no longer any overarching 
or dominant religion in Japan privileged by its association with, or 
patronage of, the state. Religion is no longer a public matter but has 
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been confined to the private sphere. Whilst there is still widespread 
popular participation in the socially-oriented rituals and practices of 
the established religions of Shinto and Buddhism, social change, al- 
lied to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, along with 
the increasingly consumer-oriented nature of Japanese society, has 
stimulated immense growth in the scope of religious choice, which in 
and of itself acts as a strong bulwark against the possibility of any 
religion attaining a position of dominance or privilege in the future.' 
The legal separation of religion and state, the processes of religious 
privatization and the multiplicity of competing religious movements 
and choices, however, do not necessarily mean the non-existence of 
core religious values or meanings common to a large majority of 
people; nor do they mean that religion can no longer play a part in 
framing the self-awareness or identity of a society and its people. As 
various scholars such as Byron ~arhart%nd myself5 have shown, 
there is a general core of commonly held assumptions, beliefs, prac- 
tices, customs, attitudes and expectations that still (even in a society 
which is itself undergoing rapid change) continue to provide a sense 
of unity and cultural belonging to the large majority of Japanese 
people, and to contribute to the construction and affirmation of 
Japanese identity, even in the absence, nowadays, of the former as- 
sociation between religion and state.6 
To some extent this notion of a shared religion which, whilst it is 
not of any one particular tradition, extends across a society and cul- 
ture even where a formal separation of religion and state exists, is 
similar to that articulated by Robert Bellah in his famous essay on 
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civil religion in America. In that essay Bellah sought to demonstrate 
that the separation of religion and state, and the lack of any one 
dominant or privileged religion, does not mean that the society con- 
cerned has no set of core religious values. Bellah argued that socie- 
ties, even where there are legal bonds that separate state and relig- 
ion, and prevent the emergence of a dominant religious form that, 
through union with the state, serves to provide a sense of identity 
and to act as a unifying force within society, may nonetheless have, 
or develop, a form of religion widely shared by the vast majority of 
the members of that society, and that helps affirm common belong- 
ings and a sense of national identity. This religion, which Bellah, 
following Rousseau, termed civil religion, is not predicated upon 
specific personal commitment in terms of beliefs and doctrines, but 
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rather reflects a shared social, cultural and religious sense of identity 
and belonging. 
Bellah's discussion of civil religion expresses the view that "the 
separation of church and state has not denied the political realm a 
religious dimen~ion,"~ and he draws attention to the ways in which 
politicians such as President I<ennedy have made use of religious 
terminology within a non-denominational framework, to emphasize 
symbols and values apparently common to and shared by American 
people in general. While Bellah focused primarily on such values, 
symbols and images, he also drew some attention to public rituals 
and calendrical events such as Memorial Day, which he suggested 
constituted an "annual ritual calendar for civil religion."9 To Bellah 
this American civil religion of symbols, values, images and events is 
made up of "certain common elements of religious orientation that 
the great majority of Americans share ... [that] provide a religious 
dimension for the whole fabric of American life," O which "served as 
a genuine vehicle of national religious self-understanding."" 
It should be noted that (although Bellah does not specifically em- 
phasize this point) civil religion per se has no organization or sus- 
tained structure, certainly none ordained by any particular authority; 
hence it could be open to various patterns of interpretation or use by 
different groups. Bellah's discussion primarily draws attention to the 
politicized aspects of civil religion, and argues that it provides a link 
between the citizen and the state, a function that has been of little 
real contention in a society such as the USA where "the relation be- 
tween religion and politics ... has been singularly smooth."12 How- 
ever, civil religion is not limited to the sphere of the relationship of 
citizen and state, but extends further to being "a point of articulation 
between the profoundest commitments of the Western religious and 
philosophical tradition and the common beliefs of ordinary Ameri- 
cans.'~'~ 
Bellah's essay stimulated general discussion about the nature (or, 
indeed, the very existence) of civil religion in the USA and else- 
where. One element in these discussions has been whether a civil re- 
ligion of shared assumptions and values made it primarily a religion 
of the masses rather than the elite (and, indeed, whether it might not, 
as a whole, be a construct used by the elite so as to control and ma- 
nipulate the masses). Karel Dobbelaere (whose article provides a 
good outline of some of the general theories and discussions of 
scholars concerned with civil religion) draws attention to sociological 
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research that demonstrates that those with the highest levels of edu- 
cation score least well in affirmations to a commitment to elements of 
civil religion, and states that "it seems then that civil religion rests on 
the masses rather than on the elite and those in potential power po- 
sition~."'~ 
Whether a religion of the masses or not (and, as my preliminary 
comments on the shared aspects of Japanese religion, above, have 
implied, I think that civil religion such as it is in Japan is nothing if 
not a shared, popular - i.e. of the people - religion), discussions have 
also questioned how far civil religions continue to operate in what 
are increasingly fragmented modern societies. Bellah himself, less 
than a decade after his first article, commenting on what he saw as 
the growth of self-interest and the increasing fragmentation of 
American society and the alienation of many sectors of society, ap- 
peared to come to the view that civil religion was no longer able to 
provide the unity and sense of shared belongings he had earlier dis- 
cussed, and called American civil religion a "broken and empty 
shell. "I5 
Other scholars have further questioned whether the processes of 
socialization that have brought about the secularization of modern 
societies might have themselves served to secularize and thereby 
emasculate civil religion. Karel Dobbelaere, for example, argued that 
the increasing differentiations within modern industrial societies 
have made the processes of social integration increasingly complex 
and indeed problematic; civil religion thus has less influence in pro- 
viding a core of integration and identity to such societies and is 
hence in some decay.16 
Having questioned whether civil religion was in the process of de- 
caying or disintegrating in modern societies, however, Dobbelaere 
appended an interesting postscript in which he suggested that civil 
religion continued to operate in Japan, although he also wondered 
whether it might, too, in time fragment and disintegrate. I shall 
shortly comment on what Dobbelaere saw this "civil religion" as be- 
ing, but first I should note that he is by no means alone in affirming 
the existence of a civil religion in Japan. Indeed, whilst scholars con- 
cerned with American civil religion seem to frame their discussions 
around whether it is broken and in decline, various postwar and 
contemporary studies of religion in (secular) Japanese society have 
drawn on the concept of civil religion to draw attention to shared 
cultural and religious values as well as religious and cultural sym- 
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bols, rituals and practices, that help frame Japanese identity and con- 
sciousness (or that have been utilized for that purpose), and to 
thereby argue that a civil religion in some form or other exists in 
contemporary Japan. 
Certainly there is much in Bellah's discussion that is, as I have al- 
ready suggested, pertinent to discussions of religion in Japan, espe- 
cially in terms of the general frameworks of shared religious as- 
sumptions that continue to provide a sense of unity and cultural 
identity to the large majority of Japanese people, and that provide (to 
paraphrase Bellah) a point of articulation between the profound 
commitments of Japanese religious traditions and the common be- 
liefs and, it is important to stress, the customs and practices of ordi- 
nary Japanese people. While this civil religion may not be as closely 
concerned with the political realm as in the USA (since Japan has not, 
since the war at least, experienced the smooth relationship between 
religion and politics that Bellah sees in the USA), it remains con- 
cerned with national images. Even though Japan is now a de facto 
secular society, it is, I would argue, possible to discern a common, 
shared, civil religion in Japan. It is the intention of this current essay 
to first discuss some of the theories and ideas that have been dis- 
cussed in recent years over what, if anything, such a Japanese civil 
religion might consist of, and then to outline what I see as its com- 
ponent parts. 
Theories of Civil Religion in Postwar Japan 
The strong bonds in prewar Japan between Shinto and the state, and 
the close associations between Shinto and aspects of Japanese na- 
tionalism have made Shinto an obvious focus of many discussions on 
civil religion in Japan. Some commentators, wary perhaps of the 
reemergence of a union between Shinto and the state, have discerned 
in postwar Shinto and in the attempts that have been made by inter- 
ested parties to revise its status or to reinstate some of its prewar 
privileges, the seeds of an emergent civil religion. 
K. Peter Takayama, for example, has drawn attention to what he sees 
as a resurgence of Japanese nationalistic religious sentiments, which 
he identifies especially with the Yasuluni shrine, the Shinto shrine 
for deceased soldiers that was supported by the state as a national 
shrine in the prewar era, and the periodic attempts made (generally 
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by those on the political right) to restore its former status as a 
state-funded shrine and national memorial to the dead.17 In these 
moves, and in the attempts he perceives as being made to link relig- 
ious feeling to such national symbols, and particularly to Shinto, 
Takayama suggests that there is an attempt to revitalize Japanese 
civil religion. It is a revitalization because, in his eyes, it involves re- 
storing (albeit in a less oppressive form) Shinto to the sort of position 
it occupied prior to 1945, as the predominant focus of Japanese relig- 
ious identity. This revitalization, he sees, is "the effort to restore 
something sacred out of the past, spurred by a sense of decadence in 
the present."l%ince Shinto, according to Takayama, is considered by 
many Japanese to be not so much a private (i.e. personal) religion as 
a public (i.e. community-centered) one, it can be utilized, adopted 
(and presumably, one would add, manipulated), for civil purposes. 
Takayama considers that the Yasukuni issue is but one of a number 
of interrelated ones (including attempts to reform the education 
agenda to place more focus on the glories of Japanese history and to 
thereby infuse a greater sense of patriotism amongst the young) con- 
cerned with restating nationalist agendas and with rearticulating a 
sense of national strength and pride. 
Takayama appears, therefore, to be suggesting that attempts are 
being made to restore Shinto to the form of status, if perhaps in a less 
extreme manner, that it previously had as supporter and legitimator 
of the state and as the dominant medium for the expression of Japa- 
nese identity and social cohesion. There are aspects of his thesis that 
I find pertinent to discussions of civil religion in Japan, particularly 
the notion of restoring something sacred from the past - or to be 
more accurate, of attributing the past, and the notion of tradition, 
with special and almost sacred qualities. This extends beyond the 
limited spheres of Shinto nationalism, however, to the amorphous 
yet strong trend in contemporary Japanese social, cultural and relig- 
ious life towards the idealization of traditional Japanese culture and 
landscape, and of the Japanese past. This is found in the nostalgi- 
cized images of traditional Japan used in numerous forms of popular 
literature and advertisements produced by such diverse groups as 
political parties, Buddhist sects, tourist boards and food vendors." It 
is especially prevalent in such emotionally-laden terms and concepts 
as furusato, a term literally meaning "one's native village," which is 
suggestive of a Japanese landscape and community steeped in Japa- 
nese cultural traditions and unsullied by external, modernizing and 
Ian Reader 
westernizing infl~ences.~' The attempts made by the (then) ruling 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from the 1970s onwards to promote 
rural regeneration and to strengthen the social, cultural, and eco- 
nomic fabric of the country at local levels through theirfurusatozulcuri 
("building a new furusato") movement and policies are some of the 
more public aspects of this wider trend.21 
While Takayama is correct in drawing attention to the ways in 
which the past has become idealized and valorized in Japan, the 
main problem with his thesis is that he relates it to Shinto alone, and 
in particular to Shintoesque religious nationalism centered on such 
symbols as the Yasukuni shrine. This, it seems to me, allows the con- 
cept of civil religion to be too readily trapped by the ghosts of the 
past. Certainly prewar Shinto provided a form of civil religion which 
focused on a number of symbols (e.g. the ~m?,eror, Yasukuni shrine, 
etc.) and imbued them with religious significance for the Japanese 
nation as a whole. However, to assume that, because Shinto formed 
the basis of prewar civil religion, any modern form of civil religion 
has to revolve around Shinto and the symbols it utilizes is, I would 
argue, to misunderstand what civil religion represents and to draw 
its parameters too narrowly. 
Certainly the uses of symbols such as the Emperor and Yasukuni 
could contribute to the kind of emotional sense of shared belongings 
and heritage that is a vital underpinning to civil religion. Yet, as the 
uses made of such images of cultural heritage as the furusato and of 
Japanese tradition show, there is ample opportunity to affirm this 
shared sense of emotion without recourse to such controversial and 
hence potentially divisive symbols as the Emperor (at least in relig- 
ious contexts) or Yasukuni shrine. Moreover, while Shinto can be 
oriented towards expressing a form of religious nationalism, it 
would be wrong to think that it alone has this potential: the Buddhist 
sects also make use of similarly emotionally charged symbols and 
images of nationalism and Japanese cultural identity, as their espou- 
sal of emotionally charged terms such as the Jirrusato, and their at- 
tacks on Western cultural values, dem~nstrate .~~ The new religions, 
and especially the "new" new religions have, particularly in recent 
years, also expressed forms of religious nationalism that are often 
more vehement and expressive than anything found in contempo- 
rary Shinto rhetoric. 
Perhaps more importantly, I find Takayama's perspective prob- 
lematic in that the symbols he deals with (those connected to a spe- 
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cific religious tradition) are in themselves contentious and contain 
within them not so much values shared by the large majority, but 
rather, the potential for division and dissent. They are perhaps too 
concerned with the body politic and with the state, in a society in 
which the relationship between religion and politics is not (unlike 
Bellah's view of the USA) smooth, but instead is liable to give rise to 
conflict and fissure. Although Takayama states that this move to 
revitalize Japanese civil religion rests on popular sentiment and 
opinion, he does not provide any clear data to underpin this state- 
ment. 
It is, in fact, possible to argue that such moves rather than being 
based on popular support at best generate indifference. Certainly 
that is an impression I have gained through lengthy discussions with 
friends and colleagues in many walks of life in Japan, and through 
my observations of opinions expressed in the media and elsewhere 
in Japan, that probably the majority of people in Japan are either in- 
different to or tired of the whole series of manipulations surrounding 
such questions as the Yasukuni affair, and other such constitutional 
wrangles. This is not to downplay the obviously strong feelings felt 
by many people and organizations on such issues so much as to 
point out that there are also many who seem relatively unconcerned 
in such matters. 
More importantly, as Takayama himself notes, the whole series of 
disputes concerning the relationship of religion and the state of 
which Yasukuni remains one particularly charged symbol, also have 
generated a strong groundswell of opposition as well. Many groups 
and organizations from political parties to labor unions to religious 
movements (including new religions and movements of Buddhist 
and Christian persuasions) have aligned themselves against any re- 
visions of the law. Other potential symbols of a resurgent nationalist 
Shinto, whether concerned with the revision of textbooks or the en- 
thronement of an emperor, are equally contentious at these levels, 
and are liable to produce fissures rather than cohesion in society. 
This is, ultimately, why a civil religion in a society such as Japan 
where religion in its involvement with politics and the state has 
taken on oppressive aspects, cannot be based in, or revitalized 
through the use of, such symbols as state support for Shinto shrines 
or the reassertion of a politicized religious nationalism. Civil religion, 
if it is genuinely going to express values, assumptions and practices 
shared by the large majority of a society, cannot provoke widespread 
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dissent, conflict or fissure within that society without rapidly acquir- 
ing the status of a broken and empty shell. It is about shared, not di- 
visive, issues and values, and since the attempts to restate the pre- 
eminence of a Yasukuni-centered Shinto nationalism do provoke 
genuine and heated dissent, it would be reasonable to suggest that 
they cannot truly form the core of contemporary civil religion. 
Not all those who see a newly emergent civil religion locate it 
within the parameters of Shinto, however. There are some analysts 
such as Winston Davis who argue that if a civil religion is to exist or 
emerge in Japan, it will (like Japanese society itself) be secular in 
context, and not aligned as such to religious  tradition^.^^ Davis, hav- 
ing constructed a strong case for his argument that Japan is a 
"relatively secular culture,"24 considers that until 1945 the Japanese 
"sense of identity ... rested explicitly on religious  foundation^;"^^ until 
that year a civil religion formed by State Shinto and its ideology and 
symbols, such as the Emperor, the state and the special place of the 
Japanese people as expressed in Shinto nationalism, existed. The 
severance in law of the bond between religion and the state brought 
an end to this, and heralded the advent of a secular society, not just 
publicly and in law but also in private. The secularizing tendencies 
of a modern industrial society have led to increasingly secular atti- 
tudes amongst the populace. 
Davis suggests that in this process civil religion also has been 
secularized, arguing that Nihonron, a term Davis translates as Japan 
Theory, the amorphous debates and discussions in Japan about na- 
tional character, identity, and the nature of being Japanese, is in itself 
a form of emergent secularized civil religion. Such debates include 
but are not confined to the Nihonjinron (discussions about being 
Japanese) theories that have, as with Japan Theory in general, sought 
to prove or affirm Japanese cultural uniqueness, generally starting 
from the premise that Japan and the Japanese are somehow unique 
and special, and seeking to illustrate this through comparisons 
(invariably lacking in any sound analysis) with other cultures. The 
point of comparison, as Davis rightly notes, is not to understand 
other cultures but to demonstrate how different Japan is from them, 
and the gist of all such theory is in constructing a sense of identity 
and shared cultural values and attributes that mark out the Japanese 
from all others. Davis correctly presents all such debates as a search 
for national identity - which is, he notes, a form of secularized civil 
religion. 
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The Nihonron and Nihonjinron debates certainly contribute to the 
contemporary construction of identity and of cultural belonging; as 
Davis comments, "many of the functions of the civil religion of 
pre-1945 Japan - the generation of national purpose, symbolic 
self-defense, value-consensus, etc. - are now being assumed by the 
symbols, values, and imagery produced by the literature of Japan 
theory."26  ow ever, I would caution against seeing Nihonuon on its 
own as an emergent Japanese civil religion. While it is an interesting 
example of how a rather diverse assortment of ideas and images can 
create a common affirmation of the special nature of a people and 
culture, it remains too focused on images and symbols to possess 
much weight or substance as a religion in actuality. What Davis does 
not consider is that Japan Theory, rather than being an emergent 
secular civil religion, might not be a secularized theme within a 
broader, extant civil religion that encompasses secularized values 
concerning identity with shared cultural and religious values and 
I practices that, in a more overtly religious dimension, do the same 
things. Davis' discussion of what constitutes civil religion is incom- 
plete in that it concentrates on a narrow area concerned with sym- 
bols and cultural values, but fails to pay serious attention to the im- 
portant role of practices, customs, and events such as festivals, 
yearly, calendrical and life-cycle customs and rituals that are closely 
connected with issues of cultural identity, and that also, as will be 
discussed below, provide an implicit framework of ethical values 
shared by the large majority of Japanese. 
The discussion by Yanagawa Keiichi and Abe Yoshiya on the na- 
ture of religious activity and affiliation in Japan, whilst not specifi- 
cally discussing the notion of civil religion, helps provide us with 
some useful frameworks of interpretation on the subject that enable 
us to overcome the shortcomings of the theories of civil religion so 
far Yanagawa and Abe outline two interlocking forms of 
religious behavior which they term "individual religiosity" and 
"community religiosity" in Japan. The former is personal, and cen- 
tered in faith and belief; it is not primarily conditioned by social cir- 
cumstances, but through individual volition and commitment; the 
latter is more distinctly social in focus, concerned with the mobiliza- 
tion of people and resources in a community for ritual purposes, 
usually involving community members as representatives of groups. 
Participation in community events and religious rituals, they argue, 
demonstrates one's reliability, and hence is a way of affirming one's 
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identity as a member of the community, and of demonstrating one's 
(and one's family/household's) commitment to the community and 
its values. Participation in festivals and other such events thus would 
appear to involve ethical commitment to the wider community of 
which the individual is a member. Yanagawa and Abe state that in 
Japan community religiosity has precedence over individual religi- 
osity - perhaps a point that is less clearly certain in the 1990s than in 
the 1970s, when they wrote their article, but still, I would argue, 
broadly valid. A case in point from my own experience is the Japa- 
nese student I used to teach, who converted to Mormonism but who 
continued, as he informed me, to participate in various activities 
with his family, such as going to the local shrine with them at New 
Year and to the family grave at the o-bon festival not because he ap- 
proved of such customs in religious terms but because they were 
customs, family events and duties. 
Yanagawa and Abe's view of community religiosity as a dominant 
strand in Japanese religious behavior provides us with an added di- 
mension to the theories of civil religion we have met so far, not be- 
cause they explicitly posit community religiosity as civil religion, but 
because they indicate how important community religiosity is as a 
focus of action and as an expression of ethical values (which is what 
reliability is in community terms). These themes are to a degree de- 
veloped by Karel ~obbelaere'9n his previously mentioned article. 
Dobbelaere ends his assessment of civil religion in general by de- 
scribing Shinto as an "operative" religionz9 in that it provides a 
"system of attitudes, beliefs, feelings, standards, and practices that 
provide society with an ultimate context of meaning and value, in 
terms of which social life is integrated and social activities are vali- 
dated."" He thus suggests somewhat tentatively that it is Japan's 
civil reli ion; by contrast he describes Buddhism as a "conventional" 
3? 
religion in Japan, i.e. one concerned with eschatological and per- 
sonal issues of faith and belief. 
He affirms some of the points made by others about Shinto, that it 
provides a framework and set of symbols that reflect Japanese cul- 
tural identity and belonging, and states that "through its myths and 
rituals Shinto aligns itself with the whole range of Japanese mythol- 
ogy, history, tradition and aspirations."32 He pays less attention to 
the levels of symbolism and imagery (which, as I have suggested 
earlier, are too thin on their own to constitute a civil religion, but 
which are nevertheless important elements within its construction), 
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however, than to Shinto as an expression of community religiosity, 
which he clearly interprets as central to civil religion. Dobbelaere 
discusses Shinto in action through its festivals, and calendrical and 
life cycle visits to shrines, such as the shichigosan (7-5-3) festival in 
November, in which boys aged 5 and girls aged 3 and 7 are taken to 
the shrine to be blessed and placed under the protection of the Shinto 
gods, seijin no hi, the coming of age ritual for people reaching the age 
of majority, 20, which is celebrated in ~anuary,"~ and the first shrine 
visit of the year, hatsumoode, during the New Year festival, all of 
which are examples of how people are mobilized in terms of com- 
munity. He also examines Shinto's operative nature in the commu- 
nity by examining its role in commerce, by drawing attention to the 
close associations between shrines, gods, and companies, and 
showing how through such roles Shinto is harnessed to supporting 
the economic means of production. In particular he mentions the 
presence of shrines on the roofs of department stores, and the occur- 
rence of company shrines and gods whose role is to "stimulate cohe- 
sion and productivity.''34 
Dobbelaere's thesis has much to commend it, especially in its abil- 
ity to go beyond the narrow confines of symbols and images so as to 
focus on events and on the operative role played by Shinto within 
life. Where it is problematic is in its artificial division of Shinto and 
other Japanese religious traditions. Much of what he attributes to 
Shinto - the promotion of cultural values, festivals, and production, 
and the emphasis on community values, for example - are valued 
and promoted by other religious traditions as well. Buddhism, for 
example, especially in rural areas, has long played a role in the co- 
hesion of communities, particularly in its support of such primary 
social units as the household. Its priests have also performed rituals 
for the well-being of society and of companies, and Buddhism has 
lent its moral support to the processes of production through such 
rites and through the promotion of ethical values designed to en- 
courage hard work and loyalty." Buddhism also plays a major role 
in the cycle of calendrical events in Japan, and it has been associated 
with the promotion of Japanese cultural values, and at times of na- 
tionalist sentiment as well. Certainly Shinto aligns itself with the 
whole of Japanese mythology, history, tradition and aspirations, but 
Buddhism also has a very deep and close, indeed formative, in- 
volvement with these; indeed I along with others would argue that 
to separate Shinto and Buddhism in such respects, or indeed, in 
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terms of operative effects and manifestations within Japanese soci- 
ety, is to misrepresent their often interactive roles.36 
It would be fair, also, to point out that the new religions of Japan, 
which in broad terms share many of the assumptions and perspec- 
tives of the established religions, also display some common charac- 
teristics in these areas. Many new religions carry out festivals and 
calendrical rituals such as hatsumoode and shichigosan, whilst their 
expression of themes of Japanese cultural power and identity are an 
important element within their make-up and in their appeal to fol- 
l o w e r ~ . ~ ~  
What Dobbelaere attributes to Shinto alone is part of a wider, 
shared arena that cuts across the boundaries of any one religious 
tradition in Japan, but which has points in common with them all. 
While the issues he deals with, such as rituals, practices and social 
customs, are operative religious elements in Japanese culture that af- 
firm and confirm identity and social cohesion, and hence are intrinsic 
aspects of civil religion, they are not limited to one religious tradition 
alone. 
Of Images, Identity, Rituals and Benefits: The Nature of 
Japanese Civil Religion 
What is interesting in, and common to, all the previous discussions is 
the view that a civil religion in some form exists or is in the process 
of emerging in Japan and that, despite the obvious ethnocentric ten- 
dencies within it, it is not necessarily limited directly to politics and 
the state. I have already made it clear that I share in the sentiments of 
authors such as Davis, Takayama, and Dobbelaere, in their view that 
a civil religion exists in Japan, and I have suggested that it contains 
elements that each of them has drawn attention to, although I have 
also suggested that their perspectives on civil religion need to be 
widened a little. In particular I would like to extend Dobbelaere's fo- 
cus on practical and ritual events (events that are of course not re- 
stricted only to Shinto) and relate it to some of the wider issues of 
national image and the construction of cultural identity expounded 
by Davis, to suggest that a civil religion shared by most Japanese and 
concerned with and consisting of common concerns, practices, val- 
ues, ethics, emotional constructs and orientations exists, extending 
beyond the boundaries of any one religion but sharing common 
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ground with most active religious traditions in Japan. This civil relig- 
ion is practical in purpose and is, in effect, a popular religion that ex- 
presses the common language of religion; as such it is not associated 
or aligned with areas of activity or image that provoke dissent and 
conflict. 
Its role in framing identity has been widely recognized, and as 
Davis has shown in his discussion of Japan Theory, cultural belong- 
ing in itself is part of civil religion, providing an emotional under- 
pinning of identity. This emotional sense of belonging is enhanced 
by the processes that ascribe special cultural significance to such as- 
pects of Japan as its landscape, sacralized through the imagery of the 
furusato discussed earlier. The notion of the land as sacred has, of 
course, been a recurrent theme in Japanese religious traditions, ex- 
pressed not only in Shinto myths which depict a direct relationship 
between the land and the Shinto gods, but in the religious traditions 
that consider mountains to be specially sacred, and in the folk and 
Buddhist traditions, whose Buddhas and Bodhisattvas and other 
deities frequently manifest themselves in legends to sacralize a par- 
ticular location. The ways in which the furusato, which is deeply in- 
grained with notions of traditional belonging and of yearning for an 
idealized, lost past has been utilized as an image both politically and 
religiously, reflect a continuation, albeit often in more secular terms, 
of these processes of sacralizing the landscape." This, I have already 
suggested, can be related also to Takayama's notion of a revitalized 
civil religion which sought to "restore the sacred out of the past." 
Thus the emotive language used to idealize the furusato as a symbol 
of shared traditions, unsullied by the present (and untouched by the 
outside world), manifests an attempt to build a new sense of emo- 
tional community and belonging framed round a series of images of 
a shared past that never really existed, but which provide a strand of 
common identity central to Japanese civil religion. 
Rhetoric and images alone, however, as has been stated earlier, do 
not constitute a coherent religion, not even an amorphous civil relig- 
ion. Shared emotions and feelings are made real and brought into life 
through actions and practices. The furusato imagery would be little 
more than shallow rhetoric were it not used to attract people to 
events and activities associated with traditional religious culture, 
such as festivals and pilgrimages, and it is through performing such 
activities that participants may acquire the emotive feeling of return- 
ing to their roots, of experiencing the shared emotions of the furusato 
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along with their fellows. Icurehayashi Shooji considers that a major 
reason for the popularity of festivals (matsuri) is that they have come 
to be seen as representing a "spiritual homeland" (lcolcoro no furusato) 
for the Japanese who have lost their roots in modern society." It is 
through participating in festivals, in visiting the shrines and enjoying 
the fun, the excitement and the frivolity of the festival, that such ex- 
periences are encountered and that the emotional values of the im- 
agery are made real. 
It is thus through practice and through concrete actions that the 
values of Japanese civil religion are expressed and made visible. This 
point is demonstrated by the symbolic meaning of the milcoshi, or 
portable shrine, used to transport the shrine deity around the local 
area, which plays a part in many festivals. The milcoshi is usually car- 
ried by young men who represent the various households within the 
shrine's parish. Their participation, inter alia, thus represents a form 
of community religiosity, expressing the participants' reliability and 
sense of obligations to the community. Since these portable shrines 
are usually cumbersome, to carry them properly involves close coop- 
eration between the carriers, and it entails them all pulling together 
at the same time. The carrying of the milcoshi thus serves as a meta- 
phor for the importance of cooperation between households (of 
whom the carriers are representatives) and within the community. 
Though such ideals, which are expressed in other parts of many fes- 
tivals as well, might appear to be more pertinent to rural agricultural 
places which depend on communal approaches to farming, they also 
are reflected in many urban festivals as well, as if to emphasize the 
point that urban communities also require a shared sense of unity 
and cooperation amongst their members. 
Besides being a vehicle for the overt expression of civil religious 
values on this level, festivals also serve as a vehicle for creating civic 
pride and community spirit whilst simultaneously also boosting the 
economic standing of the communities that run them. A good ex- 
ample of this is the Kobe Festival, which was established by the civic 
authorities in the 1971 as a means of establishing community spirit 
amongst the people of Kobe, a motive that appears to have been suc- 
cessful in that the citizens of the town and of its various wards and 
districts actively participate in the festival. Besides being a focus of 
civic pride the festival has, as intended, provided a major boost to 
commerce and to tourism in the city, drawing visitors from across 
Japan and thereby enriching the city's economy c o n ~ i d e r a b l ~ ~ ~  a 
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good example of how religious themes may be utilized to stimulate 
I economic development. 
I Festivals thus represent a manifestation of civil religion which 
I fosters community spirit and encourages the economic growth of the 
I community. The Japanese have high rates of participation not just in 
festivals but in numerous other calendrical rituals and events I (nenjuugyoqii), including those associated with the life cycles of indi- 
viduals and families, that are held at shrines and temples. These 1 serve further to provide a recognizable and socially framed structure ' 
to the cycle of change in the lives of people and communities; un- 
derpinning this is a notion, rooted in the patterns of agricultural life 
but still influential in urbanized industrial Japan, that there is a 
commonly-shared rhythm and cycle to life, to which people are 1 aligned through the expression of seasonal rituals. 
This pattern of calendrical events and rituals remains important in 
1 urban and rural areas alike and, indeed, could be seen as a unifying 
point between them. Tokyo dwellers who make the customary New 
Year visit to a shrine or temple (and who probably will be part of a 
massive crowd of visitors) may also watch, on the television, cele- 
brations of the New Year festivities as they are held across the coun- 
try, and can see, for instance, village dwellers in Kyushu performing 
(albeit without the massive crowds) similar activities. They can thus 
simultaneously be aware of the regional aspects of Japanese society 
as expressed through local variations in the festival, and of the com- 
mon national threads that run through it. Such occasions as hatsu- 
moode thus serve to affirm a sense of Japanese identity and commu- 
nity, reminding everyone that throughout the country people are 
doing much the same thing at this time, and making them feel parts 
of the same whole. The rites at New Year, indeed, extend beyond the 
shrine visit alone, to numerous activities that are more clearly secular 
in focus, from the commonly-performed acts of house cleaning and 
settling of debts before the end of the old year, to business rituals 
such as shigoto hajime, in which company employees make a pledge 
of allegiance to the firm at the start of work in the new year. Besides 
the role these play in affirming identity and social cohesion they, im- 
portantly, also express a sense of optimism and a wish for happiness 
and renewal in the coming year, and consequently help express the 
inner wishes of the people and the goals they hold both individually 
and collectively.41 
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There are numerous events of community religiosity and of calen- 
drical rituals that the Japanese may take part in: space does not 
permit a detailed list here, but several have been mentioned already. 
They include the shickigosan festival, seasonal festivals such as set- 
subun in February which welcomes the coming of spring, rituals and 
prayers for personal protection during the yalcudoshi or "unlucky 
year" (42 for men, 33 for women), and the various rituals concerned 
with memorializing the ancestors and focused on the graves of the 
dead, such as higan at the spring and autumnal equinoxes and o-bon 
in August. 
Such calendrical and life-cycle rituals are, as has been discussed 
above, expressions of community religiosity that serve to affirm 
cultural and social orientation and identity. Participation is not a 
matter of personal belief so much as an expression of commitment to 
and identity with one's fellows. At the widest levels, then, taking 
part in ritual events such as hatsumoode is a practical means of ex- 
pressing what is implied by the images of cultural unity and belong- 
ing: ritual events thus are practical manifestations and intrinsic parts 
of civil religion. 
This brings me to a further, and to my mind, crucial dimension to 
civil religion in Japan. All the events and festivals mentioned focus in 
some respect on what might be termed practical benefits, on the 
amelioration of life, and on the importance of prosperity and happi- 
ness. At hatsumoode, for example, it is customary to pray for protec- 
tion from bad luck and for the acquisition of good luck in the coming 
year, and it is common for people during their shrine visits to ac- 
quire various religious objects, talismans and lucky charms that 
symbolize these things. The shichigosan festival, in seeking divine 
protection for the children involved, aims to bring them happiness 
and good fortune. Agricultural festivals express the wishes of the 
community for a good and fruitful harvest, and, like all festivals, ex- 
press the joy and celebration that are intrinsic to the living of a pro- 
ductive and happy life. The o-bon festival expresses the wish and 
hopes of the family for the well-being in the other world of their de- 
ceased and their ancestors. Since it is a common theme of Japanese 
views of the dead that the welfare and prosperity of the living is 
supported and watched over by the ancestors, and since failing to 
perform the correct rituals for the dead is to invite misfortune and 
bad luck, a further common thread to rituals and festivals for the 
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dead implicitly seeks to ensure the good fortune and welfare of the 
living. 
Seeking benefits in the present life from their gods, Buddhas and 
other spiritual entities is a religious activity that the vast majority of 
Japanese are involved in either periodically or regularly. Virtually all 
rituals and events concerned with community religiosity, from hat- 
sumoode to local festivals, involve participants in making offerings 
and requests to the gods and Buddhas which seek their help and 
support in the pursuit of human goals and needs. Such benefits 
range from the spiritual (for example, peace of mind) to the more 
overtly material; they may be communal in nature and aimed at the 
common good, as in community agricultural festivals seeking a good 
harvest, centered on commercial concerns, or in company-sponsored 
shrine rituals that utilize the gods to stimulate and support the 
means of production, or familial, as with families praying together 
for the welfare of their household at New Year. They may also be 
personal and individual: students pray for success in their examina- 
tions, drivers for safety on the road, businessmen for company pros- 
perity, young women for a happy marriage, couples for conception, 
for safe childbirth and for a healthy baby, and old people for longev- 
ity, for cures from illness and, when the time comes, for painless 
death. 
Although the above appear to be largely centered around material- 
istic and self-serving ends, however, implicit within the process of 
seeking benefits are a number of themes that express ethical values 
and perspectives on life that are, I would argue, core issues in Japa- 
nese civil religion providing a moral framework for life and a relig- 
ious underpinning to Japanese cultural aims and common values. 
Such prayers and the wishes they express reflect the importance of 
living a fruitful and happy life, which is certainly a primary focus of 
Shinto ritual, and which is expressed also as a core ethical value by 
many new religions; Tenrikyo, for example, emphasizes the ethical 
importance of yookigurashi, living a bright and happy life. Seeking 
benefits from the gods and Buddhas is an action in accord with a ba- 
sic purpose to life in such terms; happiness is thus in and of itself an 
ethical value. Since success as a goal in life is affirmed through the 
support of the gods and Buddhas, this further provides powerful 
legitimization for the pursuit of prosperity in material terms and 
gives strong ethical support to the attainment of economic success at 
Ian Reader 
personal, community, company and national levels, for the common 
good as well for personal advancement. 
Prayers for practical benefits and seeking the aid of the gods in the 
pursuit of human endeavors display a commitment towards the at- 
tainment of goals, not necessarily just in a personal sense but in 
terms of a sense of wider social responsibility. Praying for kootsuu an- 
Zen, traffic safety, and acquiring the protection and support of the 
gods and Buddhas in this, implies and indeed requires that the peti- 
tioner should behave in a virtuous way; it involves a commitment to 
drive safely, to care for others, and to avoid accidents not just for 
one's own sake but for that of all people. Indeed, travel safety amu- 
lets and talismans hanging up in vehicles such as taxis, buses and 
trains can serve as a form of public policy statement by the commer- 
cial concerns that use them, aimed at reassuring the traveling public 
of the firms' commitment to ensuring their safety, and acting as a 
reminder to drivers of their social responsibilities for their passen- 
42 gers. Students who pray for educational success undertake a moral 
responsibility to work hard (hence repaying their parents' and teach- 
ers' hopes and wishes) and to succeed not just for themselves but for 
their family and community. 
The moral attitudes underlying prayers for prosperity and happi- 
ness are further reinforced by the obligations incurred within them 
to provide something in return, both through making offerings to the 
gods, shrines and temples (an inherent part of the process of prayer 
and worship in Japan) and through the expression of gratitude to 
those deities afterwards. The importance of reciprocity as a social 
value and virtue which allows society to function smoothly and for 
its members to understand their relationships and obligations to 
their fellows is widely recognized and understood within Japanese 
society, and it is reaffirmed through the relationship people have 
with their gods and through the processes of seeking benefits. The 
duty to repay gratitude (ongneshi) is a vital ethical injunction and ac- 
tivity in many Japanese religious traditions, such as the new relig- 
ions, which stress gratitude as a moral virtue" and established Bud- 
dhist sects such as Soto Zen, in whose cardinal text the Shushoogi an 
extended section is devoted to this virtue.44 The practice of returning 
to shrines and temples to give thanks for favors, blessings and 
benefits received is not just emphasized as a moral injunction by 
Buddhist and Shinto priests and institutions alike (perhaps not sur- 
prisingly, since this involves return visits and donations to the insti- 
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tutions); it is also a major theme within Japanese shrine and temple 
visiting, and within popular religious practice. Indeed, studies of 
shrine-visiting activity, based on Ishikiri shrine in eastern Osaka, 
show that a large number of such visitors, especially long-term 
I regular visitors, are motivated by the wish to give thanks and repay 
1 gratitude to the deity for benefits received in the past.45 
I Seeking benefits in this world thus is a central aspect of all Japa- 
nese religion, which expresses commonly held views of the world 
I and reflects ethical values and shared assumptions; it is thus part of 
1 civil religion, one that perhaps all Japanese of whatever personal re- 
I ligious faith would share, carried out in virtually all religious tradi- 
tions and movements active in Japan. As a final comment on this 
~ point, and as an illustration that I consider shows how intrinsic and 
I hence non-controversial this whole process is, I would like to men- 
tion a visit I made to a famous Buddhist temple in the area adjacent I to Tokyo in January 1993. This particular temple is extremely popu- 
lar as a center where all manner of benefits may be sought, attracting 
vast hordes of visitors throughout the year, particularly at New Year 
when the numbers run into the millions. It has become especially 
well-known in recent years as a place to petition for traffic safety, 
and it has built a special sub-temple where services for road traffic 
safety are performed. The sub-temple has a large parking area in 
front where the drivers taking part in the service park their vehicles; 
after they have received their good luck talismans in the temple, the 
drivers return to their cars, which are then blessed by the priests. 
One of its priests showed me a book outlining the temple's recent 
history, and what caught my eye was a photograph of a traffic safety 
service held by the temple for the police department of the local pre- 
fecture. The photograph showed rows of police cars and motorbikes, 
flanked by a large number of policemen, all being blessed by the 
priests. Who, I asked, paid for the service and the talismans (which, 
as with all religious charms and the like in Japan require a donation 
to the temple)? The priest responded that, as far as he could tell, the 
police department did; in his view this was perfectly natural since it 
was the department's men and vehicles who gained the spiritual 
protection provided. When I queried whether this might have in- 
fringed the constitution, in that it involved the use of public funds 
given to and for the benefit of a religious institution, the priest at first 
looked surprised; on reflection he felt that it probably did, but that 
no one had ever thought of that, and that no one had ever objected. 
After all, the police were doing something, i.e. vowing to drive safely 
and bring good order to the public highways, that would be ap- 
proved of by all, and they were expressing concerns and wishes for 
their own safety as well as for the general public, again goals and 
values that the vast majority would understand and sympathize 
with. 
I mention this story not to make a value judgment about a prob- 
able violation of the constitution (indeed, I cannot see any grounds 
for objecting to what the police had done) but to illustrate just how 
prevalent and commonly accepted the practice of praying for and 
seeking benefits is. Indeed, I would surmise that similar technical in- 
fringements of the constitution take place on a fairly regular basis 
throughout Japan; I myself have come across other cases, including 
instances where public institutions have had memorial services for 
deceased members done at temples. Here is an activity that is en- 
tirely central to the consciousness of the vast majority of Japanese, 
and closely aligned with their feelings of what is right and what 
should be done. If the police are to drive their automobiles for the 
sake of the general good, it would seem only reasonable that they 
should be given blessings for the purpose; it would, indeed, seem 
rather unreasonable for anyone to object on constitutional grounds to 
this. 
We can see here a rather marked difference between this case and 
that of Yasukuni shrine, which has been suggested as a potential 
symbol at the heart of Japanese civil religion. Yasukuni is, as has 
been previously argued, highly contentious and more likely to pro- 
voke dissent and conflict than unity and a commonly shared sense of 
religious orientation. Conversely praying for benefits, with the un- 
derlying meanings it expresses, in the ways that the police force in 
question did, is not contentious. Rather, one would suggest, it would 
meet with general approval, testament to the fact that it is a com- 
monly 'accepted force within Japanese culture. The action of a police 
department in using public funds in a prayer service to bless their 
patrol cars and motorbikes is thus an operative expression of a Japa- 
nese civil religion that virtually all Japanese can feel at home with. 
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Conclusions 
As this article has made clear, I am in agreement with those who 
consider that a civil religion exists in Japan today. It is not, however, 
one that is framed around contentious symbols that invite dissent. To 
that degree it is not primarily concerned with the state as a political 
I entity, but with Japan as an emotional and cultural construct. 
, Although (unlike specific religions which have set doctrines and 
organizational structures) civil religion is to some degree unstruc- 
tured, it can be said to incorporate three primary and interrelated ar- 
l eas in Japan. The first is concerned, on an emotional level, with im- 
I 
ages, with cultural identity and a sense of shared heritage. The Ni- 
l honron theories are an expression of this, as are the uses made of the 
I images conjured up in the uses of the concept of the furusato. The 
second is centered on participation in various rituals and festivals I 
i that deal with and contextualize the life cycle and calendrical changes, and with expressions of commitment to units of social be- 
longing such as family, community and nation. This component ele- 
ment within Japanese civil religion thus to some degree provides a 
channel through which the previously mentioned emotional images 
concerned with identity may be materialized. The third, vital, com- 
ponent is that manifested through the process of praying for benefits, 
which expresses ethical values concerned with the common good, 
and with the importance of seeking prosperity and happiness not 
just as personal but as social values, that legitimates economic devel- 
opment and personal success, and provides social and cultural val- 
ues and goals that encourage a sense of pride in the community and 
nation at large. 
All of these elements are things with which the very large majority 
can find empathy and in which they take part. As such Japanese civil 
religion is in fact a popular and practical religion, underpinned by 
emotional values concerned with Japanese identity, reinforced by 
practical actions. It constitutes a shared set of values and actions de- 
signed to produce and uphold a happy and prosperous life for the 
community at large as well as for the individuals within it, while 
providing them with a sense of belonging and pride in that com- 
munity. 
As a final comment, however, it should be pointed out that not 
everyone in Japan will necessarily find common cause with this civil 
religion. In particular those groups who are ethnically different from 
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the Japanese (and contrary to the much-vaunted homogeneity of Ja- 
pan there are relatively large ethnic minorities in Japan, notably the 
I<oreans and Chinese) and have their own indigenous religious 
structures and practices, are not therefore liable to share in this civil 
religion. Equally, whilst much of what I have discussed as being part 
of civil religion has a centralizing impetus (in that it points to shared 
national identities, assumptions and practices) there are underlying 
affirmations also of regionalism and reassertions of local identity 
within them, as I have commented with regard to the celebration of 
festivals such as those at New Year. Nonetheless, I would suggest 
that there are enough common elements, shared at present by a large 
enough majority of Japanese, that incorporate matters of practical re- 
ligious behavior and action, notions of shared identity, and ethical 
considerations about the nature of life and of society and commu- 
nity, to constitute a civil religion - which could also legitimately be 
called popular religion, since it is of the people, and is widely shared 
- operative in Japan today. This civil religion, unlike the American 
civil religion discussed by Bellah, whose symbols and images were 
utilized by politicians to create unity, is not coterminous with the 
state or directly connected to it. Indeed it may well be that its 
strength as a common religion of the Japanese lies in its not being 
closely associated with the state as such. This is not to say that it 
cannot be manipulated, or that attempts have not been made to util- 
ize its images for political purposes; indeed, past examples have 
shown how such a process, if directed by the full force of a central- 
ized state, could take place. Nonetheless, it is probably fair to say 
that, in the present age Japanese civil religion is separate from the 
realms of politics and the state, and that much of its strength derives 
from its avoidance of such areas of potential dispute. 
What the future of Japanese civil religion is, is another matter, 
however. As this article has suggested, changing circumstances have 
had their effect on the developments of this civil religion which, in its 
present form, has developed in the postwar era after the separation 
of the religion-state axis that so powerfully shaped Japanese society, 
values and sense of identity in previous eras. How the continuing 
processes of change within society in the latter years of the century 
will affect this shared set of values and practices is a matter for fu- 
ture conjecture. Unlike the USA, where ethnic diversity has played a 
part in causing large areas of the population to reject what was es- 
sentially a white middle class-based civil religion of identity, Japan 
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still retains (despite the minorities mentioned above and numerous 
internal tensions) enough of a commonly shared culture, customs, 
actions and attitudes, for the notion of an operative civil religion to 
have some meaning. Whether, however, this will in its turn be 
eroded or undermined by social changes, as has been the case in the 
USA, or whether civil religion itself will adapt and change, and in 
what ways, is a question of interest that will require further attention 
in the future. 
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